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This paper asks to what extent the market prices in the future monetary policy decisions 
of the Czech National Bank (CNB), how this policy predictability has evolved over time, 
and whether the change in the central bank’s forecasting methodology in mid-2002 had 
any impact. Using a sample up to mid-2004, the results are threefold.  
First, three-quarters of the CNB’s decisions were in line with medium-term money 
market expectations. Notwithstanding this relatively high predictability of CNB policy, 
the average mistake in the expectations was biased upwards: over the entire IT period the 
market has priced in a higher repo rate than has actually turned out to be the case.  
Second, our analysis shows that the period in which forecasts with an active monetary 
policy (unconditional forecasts) have been used is characterized by smaller “surprises” of 
the money market. On the one hand, this may be connected with a change in the CNB’s 
communication of the forecast, including releases of verbal comments on the interest rate 
trajectory that is consistent with the outlook. On the other hand, it may reflect a different 
economic environment in the second stage of IT in the Czech Republic. 
Third, we analyze whether there is convergence or divergence between the central bank’s 
forecast-consistent interest rate trajectory and market forward rates. We show that in most 
cases market rates converged toward the CNB’s interest rate trajectory after the 
publication of the forecast. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 1998, when the Czech National Bank (CNB) switched to inflation targeting, the inflation 
forecast has been the main tool for its decision-making. Prior to July 2002, the CNB was using 
and publishing a forecast conditioned on the assumption of unchanged short-term interest rates 
(and consequently long-term interest rates) – the “conditional forecast” or “constant-interest-rate 
forecast”. This forecast showed what would probably happen in the economy if the CNB did not 
react to the expected deviations of inflation from its target. 
With consolidation of the internal forecasting and policy analysis system (see Coats et al., 2003), 
the CNB decided to move to a different forecasting methodology. Since July 2002 the CNB has 
been using and publishing an unconditional forecast or “forecast with an active monetary policy”,
1 
which includes endogenous monetary policy depicted by a simple forward-looking monetary 
policy rule consistent with the CNB’s goals.
2 Hereafter we will call the period connected with the 
constant interest rate forecast as the conditional forecast period (January 1998 – June 2002) and 
the period connected with the new methodology, i.e. forecast with an active monetary policy, as 
the unconditional forecast period (July 2002 – June 2004). 
In this paper we analyze to what extent the market was pricing in future CNB decisions. In other 
words, we ask to what extent were the decisions anticipated by market participants. In section 
two, we conduct an analysis of the whole IT time span. Later, in section three, we focus in more 
detail on the unconditional forecast period. The last section of the paper concludes with some 
policy deliberations. 
Our results show that during the unconditional forecast period, the market has been able to price 
in expected CNB decisions with greater precision than before. At the same time, there is, 
however, no clear evidence on to what extent (the CNB’s comments on) the forecast-consistent 
interest rate trajectory influences money market expectations about future interest rate 
movements.  
2. Predictability of Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy is predictable if economic agents generally expect the monetary policy decisions 
taken by the central bank.
3 This holds particularly in the case where agents understand how the 
decisions on policy rates are reached and are consequently able to predict the sign and size of the 
interest rate change. The central bank contributes to this understanding by having explicit goals 
                                                           
1 See the CNB’s July 2002 Inflation Report for a more detailed explanation of this change and Woodford (2003), 
Archer (2003) or Skořepa and Kotlán (2003) for an in-depth discussion of constant interest rate forecasts 
(conditional forecasts) versus forecasts with an active monetary policy (unconditional forecasts).  
2 See the CNB’s October 2003 Inflation Report for a description of the monetary policy rule used in the CNB’s 
Quarterly Projection Model (QPM). See also Navrátil (2004) for some estimates of the CNB’s monetary policy 
rule. 
3 In the tests that follow, we examine the market reaction one day and three days after the decision. This 
effectively means that we regard the communication surrounding the decision (press conference, statements) as 
part of the decision.  The CNB’s Policy Decisions   3 
 
(e.g. inflation targets), by explaining its decision-making (e.g. during press conferences or 
minutes) and by informing the public about the data set for the decision (e.g. the forecast).  
2.1 Beyond the Expectations Hypothesis 
Central banks can effectively control only one asset price. This is usually some short-term interest 
rate – from the overnight rate (Fed) to the two-week repo rate (CNB, ECB). Longer-term interest 
rates are then determined by the market following an arbitrage-based expectations hypothesis of 
the term structure of interest rates. In short, long rates are a function of current and expected 
future short rates and possibly some term premium. 
For example, the one-year interest rate (IR12Mt) is determined from the current two-week repo 
rate (repot) and from expected future two-week repo rates. Disregarding the term premium, we 
can write down the corresponding “term structure equation” in the following form (1) (where we 










i t t repo M IR   (1)
 
If the money market fully comprehends the central bank’s decision-making process, then the 
change in the repo rate will be expected and will be priced into market interest rates with 
maturities longer than 2W. These market rates should thus not change immediately after the Bank 
Board decision. On the other hand, if the central bank changes the interest rate unexpectedly, and 
the decision is thus not fully “priced in”, then this unexpected development will be followed by a 
change in market rates. 
We use an illustrative indicator based on Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002), which we further 
develop. The idea behind it is rather simple: the Bank Board holds meetings and makes decisions 
about interest rates every month. The one-month money market rate (1M PRIBOR) is thus a good 
indicator of expectations about the current Bank Board decision. Longer-term interest rates also 
embody expectations about future Bank Board decisions. The difference in market rates (1M 
PRIBOR) between the day after and the day before the Bank Board meeting implies to what 
extent the policy decision was (un)expected. If the decision was fully in accordance with 
expectations, then the difference is zero. If the difference is non-zero, it means that the decision 
was to some extent unexpected. 
This approach is similar to the one taken by Podpiera (2000). His focus, however, lies in testing 
the efficiency of the Czech financial market (with a negative conclusion). Interest rate responses 
several days before and after repo rate changes are thus analyzed separately.  
Matoušek (2001) also examines the reaction of interest rates to the change in the CNB’s policy 
rate. His focus is, however, different from ours. In his view, no reaction of short-term interest 
rates to a repo rate change implies transparent policy, and no change in long-term interest rates 
can be understood as highly credible policy. Comparing the market reaction to the repo rate 
changes prior to the introduction of IT to the IT period, he concludes that IT added to policy 
transparency. 4   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
 
2.2 The CNB’s Behavior 
As a warm-up for our analysis we start this section with a brief description of the frequency and 
direction of monetary policy decisions. Table 1 shows some statistics on the CNB’s monetary 
policy meetings and the decisions taken. The CNB holds regular monthly meetings on monetary 
policy. Besides these, a number of irregular meetings were held during the earlier period.  
Table 1: Number of monetary policy meetings, repo rate changes and changes in direction 
  Whole period  Conditional forecast period  Unconditional forecast period 
Number of meetings  87  63  24 
      - irregular  12  12  0 
Repo rate changes  31  25  6 
Changes in direction  4  3  1 
Note: “Changes in direction” show how many times the CNB changed the direction of the interest rate changes from 
tightening to easing and vice versa 
 
Figure 1 introduces some dynamics by exposing the 2W repo rate changes over the entire IT 
period. Apart from three 0.25 p.p. hikes, the whole period is characterized by decreasing interest 
rates in line with the disinflation process.  
Figure 1: The 2W repo rate (right-hand scale, in %) and its changes after the Bank Board 

































































































































































change in monetary policy interest rate (in p.p.)




Figure 2 presents a histogram of the repo rate changes. The interest rate cuts were not restricted to 
gradual movements (meaning 0.25 p.p. changes), but were also carried out in larger steps. 
However, the more aggressive cuts took place almost exclusively in the conditional forecast 
period.  
This brief description shows that the unconditional forecast is connected with “smoother” 
monetary policy, in the sense that there were no irregular meetings and the repo rate changes were 
more gradual. It is, however, unclear to what extent this increased “smoothness” can be attributed The CNB’s Policy Decisions   5 
 
to the end of the disinflation period and fewer external shocks and to what extent the change in the 
forecasting methodology played a role.
4  


























2.3 Measuring Predictability 
Coming back to the methodology of Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002) outlined above, in Figure 3 
we plot the difference in interest rates (2W repo rate and 1M PRIBOR) between the day after and 
the day before the Bank Board meeting. Since decisions to leave rates unchanged are just as 
important as decisions to change rates, we analyze both.
5 The change in the 1M PRIBOR 
measures the degree of surprise. A positive value, e.g. +0.25 p.p., means that the money market 
expected an interest rate 0.25 p.p. lower than was realized. In August 1998, for example, the 
money market expected the CNB to lower the rate by approximately 0.25 p.p., but in fact the 
CNB lowered it by 0.50 p.p., therefore the surprise was approximately -0.25 p.p. In December 
2002, the CNB decided to keep the interest rate unchanged. However, part of the market expected 
it to fall. On the other hand, in October 2002, the CNB lowered the interest rate by 0.25 p.p., 
which (as Figure 3 shows) was completely in accord with money market expectations. 
 
                                                           
4 For an evaluation of the CNB’s IT policy in a historical context, see Coats et al. (2003) or Kotlán and Navrátil 
(2003). 
5 It could be argued that for the financial markets decisions to change the repo rate are more important. The 
reason is that market intermediaries live from changes in asset prices triggered by interest rate moves. For the 
economy, on the contrary, it is the level of the interest rate that matters for inter-temporal decision making. To 
check for robustness we examined only a subsample of the decisions to change the repo rate. There was no major 
impact on our conclusions below. 6   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
 
Figure 3: The 2W repo rate and 1M PRIBOR – difference between the day after and the day 



























































































































































































change in 1M PRIBOR
change in 2W repo
 
 
Apart from looking at the reaction of short rates, we also examine the extent to which the decision 
is “priced in” in longer rates (12M PRIBOR). One reason to do this is that longer-term interest 
rates influence output and subsequently inflation. Therefore, the ability to influence long-term 
interest rates determines whether the CNB is successful in stabilizing the economy and fulfilling 
its targets. Another reason is that while longer-term interest rates carry only very vague 
information on the timing of policy moves, they do matter for the expected direction of policy 
moves. Figure 4 shows the difference in the 12M PRIBOR (and repo rate) between the day after 
and the day before the Bank Board meeting. The numerical interpretation is discussed in table 3 
below. 
Figure 4: The 2W repo rate and 12M PRIBOR – difference between the day after and the day 




























































































































































































change in 12M PRIBOR
change in 2W repo
 
 
The impact on short and long-term rates may also be a good indicator of the perception of 
monetary policy transparency. This is the type of analysis table 2 attempts to present. It shows a 
matrix of all the possible combinations which can occur after the Bank Board meeting. If the The CNB’s Policy Decisions   7 
 
decision was expected and it did not change the money market outlook, the 1M and 12 PRIBOR 
did not change
6 (first quadrant). But if the decision was expected and long-term interest rates 
changed at the same time, it could mean that communication changed the outlook regarding the 
future assumed repo rate development (second quadrant).  
Table 2: Matrix of reactions after the Bank Board meeting 
  no change in 12M PRIBOR  change in 12M PRIBOR 
no change in 1M PRIBOR  decision was expected and outlook was 
not changed 
decision was expected and outlook was 
changed 
change in 1M PRIBOR  decision was not expected and outlook 
was not changed 
decision was not expected and outlook 
was changed 
    
    
 
The two other combinations relate to situations where the 1M PRIBOR changed, i.e. the market 
was surprised by the decision taken. If a change in 1M PRIBOR met with no change in the 12M 
PRIBOR, it could indicate that (i) the repo rate change was not credible, or (ii) the change was in 
accord with the money market’s longer-term expectations, but the timing was different (third 
quadrant). On the other hand, if an unexpected decision (a change in the 1M PRIBOR) was 
accompanied by a change in the 12M PRIBOR, this could mean that this unexpected change was 
credible and, together with communication, influenced the money market’s repo rate outlook 
(fourth quadrant). 
It is possible to illustrate all the combinations mentioned in Table 2 with examples from the 
history of IT in the Czech Republic. The first quadrant corresponds to the October 2002 meeting, 
where it was decided to cut the repo rate by 0.25 p.p., which was fully in accord with short-term 
and long-term expectations. The decision to cut the repo rate by 0.75 p.p. at the January 1999 
meeting was expected, but the 12M PRIBOR increased at the same time. The money market 
began to expect a monetary policy tightening in the future. This expectation may have been 
influenced by a highlighting of the pro-inflationary risks by the Bank Board at the press 
conference. The meeting in January 2003 represents the third quadrant. The money market did not 
expect the repo rate cut (0.25 p.p.) this month. However, the no change in the 12M PRIBOR 
indicates either that a monetary policy easing was expected in the coming months or that the repo 
rate cut was not perceived as credible. An illustration of impacts on both short and longer rates 
(fourth quadrant) is given by the July 2003 interest rate cut of 0.25 p.p. 
Table 3 summarizes the number of combinations in each quadrant. It implies that the majority of 
the decisions (76%) were in accord with longer-term money market expectations about the future 
development of the repo rate (no change in the 12M PRIBOR). This means that the market 
anticipated the direction of policy quite well. And in most cases the money market also predicted 
the timing well (also no change in the 1M PRIBOR). The CNB’s policy thus seems predictable 
from this point of view. 
This indicator is based on the difference between rates the day after and the day before the Bank 
Board meeting. This short “window” (two days) minimizes the impact of other factors 
                                                           
6 In the empirical part later in the text, “no change” refers to a 0–0.1 p.p. movement in interest rates. 8   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
 
determining interest rates apart from the Bank Board meeting (e.g. foreign developments, release 
of new data). This is an advantage. On the other hand, market interest rates can take several days 
to adjust to the Bank Board decision. Podpiera (2000) estimates that it takes four days for the 
financial market to adjust fully to the change in the repo rate. Therefore, to check for robustness 
we also present the combinations based on the difference three days after and one day before the 
Bank Board meeting. The results for the four-day window are presented in parentheses in table 3. 
They do not differ substantially. 
Table 3: Number of combinations for each quadrant 
  no change in 12M PRIBOR  change in 12M PRIBOR 
no change in 1M PRIBOR  51 (49)  5 (7) 
change in 1M PRIBOR  15 (11)  16 (20) 
   
 
Notwithstanding the high “predictability” of the direction of CNB policy, it is interesting to note 
from table 3 that at the times the rate move was unexpected (31, or 27, out of 87), the market was 
primarily surprised on the downside, regardless of the “window” we look at. The market 
systematically expected a higher interest rate than the Bank Board actually set. The reason may be 
that the money market is more backward-looking than the CNB. If the central bank is more 
forward-looking than other agents in the economy, then – in disinflations – it will lower interest 
rates more rapidly than is generally expected. Nevertheless, by graphical inspection we can guess 
that the degree of surprise has decreased over time. The improvement in the predictability of the 
CNB’s policy is also accompanied by smaller changes in the 12M PRIBOR as the money market 
learned about the CNB’s decision pattern. This hypothesis is among the issues we investigate in 
the next section, which focuses on the unconditional forecast period. 
3. The Unconditional Forecast Period 
3.1 Publication of the Unconditional Forecast 
In the inflation targeting regime, the central bank publishes the inflation forecast as its main tool 
in the decision-making process. To make the forecast credible and transparent, its key properties 
and assumptions should also be published. In the case of the unconditional forecast, this translates 
to publishing the interest rate trajectory generated by some policy rule embedded in the 
forecasting toolbox. This trajectory is neither an assumption nor a product of the forecast – in a 
simultaneous setting, it is simply the trajectory that is “consistent” with the forecast. 
Communicating the interest rate trajectory consistent with the given forecast is, however, a tricky 
task for central bankers. This is because the interest rate path could be interpreted by less 
sophisticated market participants as a commitment of the central bank regarding future interest 
rate decisions (see the references under footnote 1 for more discussion of the issue). 
So, how do the IT central banks go about this issue? New Zealand and Canada both produce an 
unconditional forecast but differ markedly in how they communicate the interest rate trajectory. The CNB’s Policy Decisions   9 
 
On the one hand, Canada does not comment on this trajectory in any way; on the other hand, New 
Zealand publishes explicit figures for each forecast quarter.
7 The CNB is somewhere in between 
these two extreme cases. Since the launch of the new forecasting methodology in July 2002, it has 
elected to comment verbally on the forecast-consistent interest rate trajectory. The comments are 
first released at a press conference following the Bank Board meeting, then a week later in the 
Inflation Report and twelve days after the meeting in the Minutes of the Bank Board meeting.  
At the same time, the CNB carefully explains that the “…implied trajectory cannot be viewed as 
binding as regards the future path of interest rates. The arrival of new information following 
publication of the forecast can change the outlook for the evolution of the economy and the 
related consistent reaction of the central bank. The second reason is the fact that no simple, model 
reaction function can entirely precisely express the detailed monetary-policy debate that precedes 
the decision on the interest rate setting.” (see the CNB’s October 2003 Inflation Report, p. 30). 
Moreover, as central banks’ forecasting models are usually quarterly models, the forecast-
consistent interest rate path is expressed in terms of three-month rates. Needless to say, these can 
at times differ considerably from policy rates. 
3.2 The Unconditional Forecast and Money Market Behavior 
In this part we focus in more detail on the predictability of the CNB’s behavior during the 
unconditional forecast period. We aim to provide a preliminary exploration of whether the move 
to the unconditional forecasting methodology, and in particular the publication of the comments 
on the interest rate trajectory that is consistent with this unconditional forecast, changed the 
predictability of the CNB’s behavior. Figure 5 “zooms in” on the data presented in figure 3 for the 
unconditional period and adds the 12M PRIBOR series (the difference in the 12M PRIBOR 
between the day after and the day before the Bank Board meeting). 
                                                           
7 The published interest rate trajectory that is consistent with the forecast is not entirely model based, because the 
MPC “…examines the projection, calling for judgmental adjustments to the projection and occasionally to the 
underlying model and policy reaction function structure as required in order to generate simultaneously a 
plausible projection and a ‘sensible’ policy path.” (Archer, 2003, p. 13). 10   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
 
Figure 5: The unconditional forecast period: The 2W repo rate, 1M PRIBOR and 12M 
PRIBOR – difference between the day after and the day before the Bank Board 








































































































































































































change in 1M PRIBOR
change in 2W repo
change in 12M PRIBOR
 
 
Table 4 shows the mean and variance of the “surprises” (changes in the 1M and 12M PRIBOR) 
for the whole sample and two subsamples: the conditional forecast period and the unconditional 
forecast period. Only results for the two-day window are presented. After the bank started to 
publish the unconditional forecast, including its comments on the forecast-consistent interest rate 
trajectory, the mean and variance were reduced to approximately one-quarter. This change in 
statistical properties could imply that the “surprises” have been reduced in this period. It is, 
however, not possible to make a strong statement in a statistical sense on the link between fewer 
surprises and the publication of the interest rate trajectory, since the time series available are not 
long enough.  
Table 4: Mean and variance of the change in the 1M PRIBOR and 12M PRIBOR 
1M PRIBOR  Mean  Variance 
  Whole inflation targeting period  -0.075  0.039 
  Conditional forecast period  -0.096  0.049 
  Unconditional forecast period  -0.022  0.011 
12M PRIBOR    
  Whole inflation targeting period  -0.029  0.030 
  Conditional forecast period  -0.038  0.040 
  Unconditional forecast period  -0.006  0.005 
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3.3 Does the forecast-consistent interest rate trajectory anchor the expectations of the 
market? 
 
The final exercise we conduct focuses on possible co-movement of the interest rate trajectory that 
is consistent with the bank’s forecast and that expected by the market. Specifically, we examine 
whether, after the publication of the bank’s forecast, there is convergence or divergence of the two 
interest rate trajectories.
8  
Our prior expectation is that if the money market correctly understands the verbal comments on 
the forecast-consistent trajectory and its outlook corresponds to the CNB inflation forecast, the 
market yield curve should converge to that consistent with the CNB’s forecast. At the short end 
the reason is clear – it is the CNB that controls rates. At the long end, the reason for convergence 
should be based more on the credibility of the central bank’s policy and forecasting tools.
9 There 
are, however, two other issues. The first is the ownership of the forecast. If the forecast is 
produced mainly by the bank’s staff, the Board may rely on it in its decision-making process with 
varying intensity, not only across individual board members, but also over time. If the majority of 
the Board members do not identify with the forecast, there is no use in comparing the interest rate 
trajectories (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: The Board’s attitude to the forecast and the arrival of new information 
  disagrees no comparison
Board's attitude 
to the fcast 
no no comparison
agrees





Another issue is the validity of the forecast over time. Needless to say, new information may 
change our perception of the economy and hence make the forecast obsolete. It would then make 
no sense to compare the interest rate trajectory of the old forecast with the trajectory envisaged by 
the markets, as the latter already takes into account any possible “revisions” of the economic 
outlook based on the new info. However, if the new information is in line with the old forecast, 
then the forecast does not become obsolete and the comparison makes sense (again see Figure 6). 
Controlling for these two issues in the comparison is a labor-intensive exercise, since it requires 
careful reading of the corresponding Inflation Reports and Minutes. We have undertaken this 
effort and present a detailed discussion of the individual quarters in the appendix. 
For the analysis we use the 3M PRIBOR and FRA rates (3x6, 6x9 and 9x12) and construct 
differentials between these rates and the relevant interest rates from the forecasts. The results are 
                                                           
8 This analysis was first conducted in the Czech setting by Kateřina Arnoštová and David Vávra.  
9 Given that the central bank in general puts far more resources into producing its forecast than do market 
participants, its quality (at least perceived) should be better. 12   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
 
depicted in Figure  7. A positive differential means that the money market expected a higher 
interest rate. Furthermore, we study how these differentials change over time: the day before and 
the day after the Bank Board meeting, the Inflation Report release, the Minutes releases and the 
Bank Board meetings in the interim periods before the new forecast is produced.  
Figure 7:  Differences between the implied forecast-consistent interest rates and market interest 
rates (3M PRIBOR and FRAs) 
Key  
1 day before the forecast announcement 1 day after the forecast announcement
Inflation Report release Minutes release ("Big" Report)
1nd "Small" Report Minutes release (1nd "Small" Report)
2nd "Small" Report Minutes release (2nd "Small" Report)  
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Figure  7 shows that money market interest rates have converged in five cases out of eight 
(2002Q3, 2002Q4, with an initial divergence tendency in 2003Q1, in 2004Q1 and 2004Q2). The 
result is positive, albeit very preliminary: the sample is too small for any conclusion backed by 
statistically significant results. 
4. Results 
The aim of this paper was to analyze the market’s perception of the Czech National Bank’s 
interest rate changes. Special emphasis was put on the way in which the move to an unconditional 
forecasting methodology, including the publication of the forecast-consistent interest rate 
trajectory, might have influenced this perception. We have analyzed data up to the second quarter 
of 2004. 
The results of the analysis point to several conclusions. First, almost three-quarters of CNB’s 
decisions were in line with longer-term money market expectations. The CNB’s policy can thus 
be considered as predictable over this medium-term horizon. The average mistake in the 
expectations was biased upwards: over the entire inflation targeting period the repo rate has been 
expected to be higher than has actually turned out to be the case. We argue that this result might 
be explained by the central bank’s more forward-looking nature, which causes systematic 
undervaluation of the policy easing expected by the markets in disinflations.  
Second, our analysis shows that the period of the unconditional forecasting methodology is 
characterized by smaller “surprises” of the money market. The predictability thus tends to 
improve over time. It is plausible that the communication of the forecast-consistent interest rate 
trajectory might have contributed to this.  
Last but not least, we analyze whether the subsequent communication after the publication of the 
forecast has led to a closing of the gap between the CNB’s interest rate forecast and the market’s 
expectations. The result is that in most cases market rates converged toward the CNB’s interest 
rate trajectory. As in the previous case, it is, however, too early to conclude this issue with 
statistically significant results. 14   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
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Appendix 
In July 2002, the money market expected the interest rate to be reduced by approximately by 0.50 
p.p., the forecast implied -0.75 p.p. (in 2002Q3) and the Bank Board cut the repo rate by 0.75 p.p. 
Thus, the monetary policy easing was expected, but the money market undervalued this easing. 
This undervaluing may have been caused by (i) the relatively high magnitude of the easing, which 
had been seen only twice before (see Figure 2); and (ii) the July irregular meeting (July 11), where 
the Bank Board had decided to intervene in the foreign exchange market and not to change the 
repo rate (four votes for keeping rates unchanged, one for a 0.5 p.p. cut). The publication of the 
Inflation Report did not have an impact on the FRAs itself; there was a bigger reaction after the 
releases of the Minutes (July, August and September) and the September meeting. The main 
signal about a potential additional monetary policy easing was given in the September Bank 
Board meeting. Part of the money market expected the repo rate decrease (see Figure 5). During 
this quarter, market interest rates converged toward the implied ones. 
At the end of 2002Q3, the money market had broadly expected the additional interest cut of 
0.25p.p. The new October forecast implied a cut of 0.5 p.p. (in 2002Q4) and the Bank Board 
decided to lower the rate by 0.25 p.p., so this change was fully expected. The convergence to the 
implied forecast-consistent trajectory began after the November Minutes and (again) part of the 
money market expected an interest rate cut at the December Bank Board meeting (one month 
before the new forecast would be made), but the repo rate remained unchanged. In addition, it was 
mentioned in the December Minutes that an easing of monetary policy would surface during 
2003, and also the voting pattern did not indicate an interest rate bias. In this quarter, too, we can 
see a convergence in the FRAs toward the forecast-consistent interest rate path. 
In January 2003, the Bank Board decided to cut the repo rate by 0.25 p.p., which was in accord 
with the implied forecast-consistent trajectory. The money market expected stability in this 
month, although it anticipated some reduction of interest rates during 2003Q1 (as indicated by the 
3M PRIBOR). During the first two months of 2003Q1, however, the expected term structure 
diverged from the forecast-consistent term structure because money market participants started to 
expect lower interest rates, probably as actual inflation fell below the inflation forecast and even 
into negative values (see Figure 9). This can also be seen in Figure 8, which depicts the actual and 
implied 12M PRIBOR – the actual 12M PRIBOR fell below the implied 12M PRIBOR. A change 
came in March 2003, when the expected future impact of EU tax harmonization on inflation was 
commented on for the first time. It was mentioned that these tax adjustments would push inflation 
above the inflation target: “…It was stressed that the expected changes in indirect taxes were the 
largest risk from the quantitative point of view. The likelihood of implementing these changes 
was high, because they primarily involved tax harmonization. As a result, inflation could end up 
temporarily above the upper boundary of the targeted band.” (Minutes of the Bank Board meeting 
on 27 March 2003). This was affirmed by the voting pattern (7:0 for leaving the repo rate 
unchanged). 
In April 2003, the forecast implied interest rate stability and the Bank Board’s decision not to 
change repo rate was expected by the money market. However, the money market expected a 
lower interest rate level throughout the quarter. These expectations were supported by the Bank 
Board’s comments (e.g. the May meeting and the Minutes) that the inflation forecast was 
overestimated: “…the Board confirmed the rise in disinflationary risks since the last situational 16   David Navrátil, Viktor Kotlán 
 
report… Some board members expressed substantial doubts about whether or not the current 
forecast was consistent and credible enough and recommended as an exceptional case that a new 
inflation forecast be submitted early to the Board, i.e. for the discussion of the June situational 
report.” (Minutes of the Bank Board meeting on 29 May 2003). In June 2003, the Bank Board cut 
the interest rate by 0.25 p.p., which was partly expected. During this quarter the interest rates 
diverged, and the publication of the forecast did not help to bring the market’s and the CNB’s 
forecasted trajectories any closer. 
In July 2003, the money market assumed interest rate stability. Nevertheless the Bank Board cut 
the repo rate in accord with the forecast-consistent trajectory by 0.25 p.p., so the cut came as a 
surprise to the market. The yield curve, however, did not decrease, as the money market expected 
a higher interest rate path.  
In October 2003, although the forecast implied a cut of 0.25 p.p., the Bank Board kept the repo 
rate unchanged, which was in line with what the money market had expected. The decision to 
keep the repo rate unchanged was also expressed in the interest rate comments, which “played 
down” in a downside direction the implied interest rate change consistent with the forecast for the 
first time. The longer-term interest rate moved above the CNB’s forecasted trajectory and during 
2003Q4 the difference widened (see also Figure 8). 
In 2004Q1, the Bank Board decided to keep rates unchanged, which was in accord with the 
implied trajectory. Nonetheless, the forecast started to indicate the necessity of a turnaround in 
monetary policy (from cuts to hikes) in the upcoming quarters.  
The turn in the tightening direction was also implied by the April forecast. In spite of this, the 
Bank Board did not change the interest rate in April and verbally softened the implied trajectory 
(“a gradual rise”). The Bank Board rather gradually opened the way for interest rate hikes with the 
aid of minutes and press interviews. This was successful, as money market expectations regarding 
the long-term interest rate increased (see Figure 8) and the market term structure converged 
steadily toward the CNB’s forecasted trajectory. In spite of this, the increase of 0.25 p.p. in June 
was unexpected. 
Figure 8: Differences between the implied forecast-consistent interest rates (3M PRIBOR and 
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